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Abstract: Expectation formation plays a principal role in 
economic systems. We examine and revise the standard 
rational expectations (RE) model, generally taken as the 
best paradigm for expectations modelling, and suggest a 
new method to model rational expectations. Conventional 
conditions that assert the stability and uniqueness of 
popular solution methods are shown to be insufficient. 
The agent-based new modelling approach suggested in 
this paper will be shown to lead to uniquely stable 
solutions. 
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Economics dynamic 
1 Introduction 
Lots of economists believe that the main differences 
between natural systems and social systems are the 
forward-looking decisions in social systems. The use of 
expectations in economic systems goes back to the 
writings of Greek philosopher Thales of Miletus. 
Systematic use of expectations in economic modelling 
began at the beginning of the 19-th century [1]. A modern 
formal revival of the role of expectations in economics is 
by Muth [2], who introduced the concept of rational 
expectations (RE), now widely accepted as a main 
driving force of expectation formation in contemporary 
economics. 
The main idea in rational expectations is that predictions, 
always based on currently available information, made by 
decision making units in an economy, are not 
systematically wrong in that all errors are random. 
Because such predictions must, in equilibrium, be 
consistent with the model describing agents’ behaviour, a 
better term for rational expectations is “model consistent” 
expectations. Economists have mostly settled on studying 
linear versions of dynamic RE models with special 
applications to the analysis of monetary policy. Because 
of the requirement that, in equilibrium, expectations must 
be consistent with a given model’s predictions and that 
the solution of the model be uniquely stable, economists 
have developed a set of what are called “determinacy” 
conditions necessary for uniquely stable solutions of 
linear dynamic RE models. 
Determinacy conditions were originally derived in 1980 
by Blanchard and Kahn (BK) [3] and have since then 
been widely used by other economists [4-7]. More 
recently, Sims[8] developed an alternative and more 
generalized solution technique that is now also widely 
used in the literature.  
However, recently we [9] reported a weakness in the BK 
determinacy condition, a weakness also observed by Cho 
and McCallum [10] and Sims [11]. Using some simple 
contradictory examples, we demonstrated the nature of 
this weakness and underlying reasons [9]. 
Since problems with solving RE models are not limited to 
the BK approach, it is useful to take a fresh look at how 
to think of and solve dynamic RE systems.  
In this paper, we propose a new framework for modelling 
RE systems, one that is based on predictive control and 
agent-based modelling. We will show that this framework 
is consistent Muth’s [2] original conception of rational 
expectations. 
The paper is organized as follows. The following section 
briefly reviews classical RE models and shows their main 
practical weaknesses. The next section introduces new 
tools to model RE systems. We demonstrate the 
conclusions from our analysis via simulations. The last 
section gives a summary.   
2 Classical RE models 
As indicated in the introduction, RE is a hypothesis in 
economics requiring that agents in an economy form 
model-consistent expectation. In conceptional 
descriptions, rationally formed expectations of future 
variables based on available information are considered 
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to be the best possible estimates. However, as we point 
out, in classical RE models, certain weaknesses cause 
some mathematical inconsistencies. 
In classical dynamic RE models, one distinguishes 
between predetermined and non-predetermined variables 
(also known as jump variables). Predetermined variables 
have the same structure as state variables in control 
engineering; but non-predetermined variables are the best 
estimates of future values of some variables. Based on 
current information, non-predetermined variables should 
be replaced by equations of other variables. This 
procedure is known as the solution method of RE models. 
To take a closer look, we examine the approach 
advocated by Blanchard and Kahn[3]  
2.1 Summary of BK approach 
BK considered the following canonical model [3]: 
 
1
1
X X
t tA Z
tP P
t t t
γ
   +   = +
   +   
 (1) 
where X0 is given initial state and 
Xt: ‘predetermined variables’ (determined in t-1 or 
earlier) 
Pt: ‘jump variables’ (choice variables determined in t) 
Zt: exogenous (random) variables | Zt | ≤ M < ∞ 
tPt+1: expected value of Pt+1 at time t: 
 E(P | )1 t 1Pt t t=+ + Ω  (2) 
where ( ).E  is the mathematical expectation operator; 
( )tΩ  is  the information set at t; ( ) ( )1t t −Ω ⊇ Ω ; ( )tΩ  
includes  at least past and current values of X, P, Z, 
however the information set may include other exogenous 
variables than Z. Also, it may include future values of 
exogenous variables. 
Let 1 2  ... nλ λ λ≤ ≤ ≤  be n eigenvalues of A (counting 
multiplicities). Let n ∗  be the number of eigenvalues 
larger than one, then: 
PROPOSITION 1: If ( )tn dim P∗ =  then there exists a 
unique solution. 
PROPOSITION 2: If ( )tn dim P∗ >  then there is no 
nonexplosive solution. 
PROPOSITION 3: If ( )tn dim P∗ <  then there is an 
infinite number of solutions. 
2.2 A practical example 
Classical RE models are usually written at an aggregative 
level, and the stability and robustness of the closed-loop 
systems are analyzed.  
For the example, we take the following model, which is 
called the canonical New Keynesian model. It is a 
simplified version of the models which are used by 
central banks, 
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 (3) 
where x is the log deviation of output from potential 
output, Π  is the inflation rate, r  is a short-term interest 
rate controlled by the central bank, and nr  is the natural 
interest rate---the rate at which output growth proceeds at 
capacity, and unemployment is at its natural or long-run 
equilibrium level. 
The first equation describes aggregate demand (IS); and 
the second equation is aggregate supply (AS). The system 
is closed with a policy rule for tr  , which is the policy 
instrument. The following commonly described policy 
feedback rule closes the model, 
 
1r x rt t x t r tφ φ φpi= Π + + −  (4) 
In the economic literature the values of ,
x
φ φ
pi
and 
r
φ  
are selected in a way to minimize a quadratic Loss 
function involving selected the states in the model. In 
matrix form, the model is written. 
 
*
1
* 01
0
1
E x xt t t
nE A r
t t t t
r r
t t
σ
 
 + 
−      Π = Π +   +         
− 
 
 (5) 
where A is given below: 
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In this example the BK determinacy criterion holds if and 
only if two eigenvalues of A have absolute value greater 
that unity. However, Cho and McCallum [10] and 
Mostafavi, et. al. [9] have shown that even if BK’s 
determinacy condition is satisfied, the system may be 
unstable. 
2.3 The main weaknesses of classical methods 
In a recent report [9], we showed that BK’s determinacy 
condition is insufficient for the stability of RE models. 
Since other methods [8, 12]imply the same criterion for 
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simplified examples, some fundamental revision in how 
one approaches dynamic RE models is required. 
2.3.1  Structure 
Usually, economic systems have a multiple-input 
multiple-output (MIMO) structure without a centralized 
controller. In such systems, different agents activate their 
own inputs to minimize a loss function and thus differ 
from classical decentralized controllers because the loss 
function of these agents can have heterogeneous forms. In 
economic systems, it is possible that all agents act in 
unison, and it is possible that some agents act to 
minimize a state while others act to maximize it; and so 
there may be competition among them. These agents try 
to estimate the future behaviour of the system, and based 
on this estimation, they optimally determine the inputs 
that under their control. 
In economic systems, where different agents calculate 
individual and often conflicting feedback rules, stability 
and determinacy at the aggregate level is a function of the 
diverse behaviour of heterogeneous agents within the 
system. 
The inherent MIMO structure of such models and the 
presence of multi-agent behaviour are usually ignored in 
classical (engineering) methods. Interactions, not 
modelled inputs etc. cause some problems in classical 
methods. 
2.3.2 Expectation formation 
Expectation formation plays a main role in dynamic 
economic models. In classical RE models, the expectation 
terms are manifest in the dynamics of the aggregative 
closed-loop system; but for analytical purposes, it is 
necessary to find their disaggregated origins. At the 
aggregative level of the system, current states are affected 
by individual predictions of their future values, the 
aggregated effect having originated in the decision 
making structure of each agent. Each economic agent 
estimates future variables relevant to his or her welfare, 
based on currently available information and behaves in a 
way that minimizes a loss function unique to the agent. 
While the effects of individual forecasts made by agents 
directly determine the structure of current inputs, it is 
important to note that these effects influence the system’s 
structure only indirectly. So if we write the equations of 
an aggregated closed-loop system based on this construct, 
the prediction terms will also become apparent in the 
aggregated dynamic structure. 
Notice that the predictive control strategy described here 
is similar to decision making strategies typical in 
economic systems. Each decision maker knows the 
desired reference trajectory for a finite control horizon, 
and by taking into account the economic characteristics 
(mental model of the economy) decides which control 
actions (investment, consumption and etc) to take in order 
to follow the desired trajectory. Contrary to dynamic 
programming, decision rules in this framework are by 
definition discretionary: only the first (of a sequence of 
planned) control actions are taken at each instant, and the 
procedure is repeated with re-optimization for the next 
control decisions in a receding-horizon fashion. 
Compared with other classical controllers, model-
predictive controllers use more information (the reference 
trajectory), so that the behaviour of each agent is 
analogous to a predictive controller.  
2.3.3 Functional controllability 
In economic systems it is usually required that all the 
states of a system follow a trajectory, which means that 
each of the states plays the role of an output; and so the 
concept of functional controllability is needed. 
Consider a MIMO plant with m inputs and l output. In 
order to control all outputs independently the plant must 
be functionally controllable [13]. A necessary but not 
sufficient condition for functionally controllability is 
m l≥ .  
Note the differences between the following cases for a 
system with 2 agents and 2 states, 
I. The system has 3 inputs, and 2 of them are 
determined by the first agent. If the first agent is 
able to estimate the behaviour of the second 
agent the system is functionally controllable 
from the point of view of the first agent 
II. The system has 2 inputs, and only one of them is 
set by the first agent. In this case, the system is 
not functionally controllable for the first agent, 
even if it is able to estimate the behaviour of the 
second agent. The first agent would be able to 
minimize its own loss function, but this 
minimization doesn't mean following a 
trajectory for the system. 
From the above brief discussion we conclude that in a 
macroeconomic system, if the central bank is able to 
determine only one input (for example, a short-term 
interest rate) and it wants to control two different states 
(for example, the inflation rate and the output gap) 
independently, this would not be possible, even if it is 
able to estimate the behaviour of all households and 
firms. In such cases a combination of different policies 
should be used. 
3 New ideas for modeling 
3.1 Structure 
As originally emphasized by Muth[2], a proper  micro-
based description of expectations formation is essential 
for the logical consistency of an economic model and for 
its empirical relevance. Unfortunately, a common 
practice today is to write the equations without regard to 
the origins of the expectations terms. In his original 
paper, Muth actually gave an example of how one might 
go about doing this. This paper is an attempt to resurrect 
Muth’s original point. 
An economic system typically includes diverse agents. 
These agents estimate the system based on their possibly 
idiosyncratic information, forming expectations of future 
variables in order to minimize their own cost function.  
Fig.1 shows the simplest form in which we can model 
such behaviour. In this figure we have two different 
agents with an estimator and a controller. They predict 
the future of the variables and behave in a way that, based 
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on their estimation, has the best trajectory for their own 
welfare function. Each agent’s estimate is based on past 
values of other parts of economic system, the past value 
of its own output, and the known trajectory of future 
inputs to the whole system.  
The expectation of future variables is found in the 
estimator part, and then it is used in the predictive 
controller. 
Summarising, the output of the predictive controller 
includes the effect of agents' predictions. Writing the 
system equations based on an aggregation of each agent’s 
viewpoint produces equations that look like the equations 
in a typical dynamic RE model but have a number of 
different characteristics that are important to stability and 
uniqueness of the system. 
Actual economic systems are, of course the aggregations 
of individual decision structures like the one just 
described. In the economic literature, it has been common 
not to separate heterogeneous components in a model and 
not to treat each as a unique system with its characteristic 
dynamic set of equations. For our purposes, we will find 
it necessary to focus on the separate behaviours of 
individual decision makers in order to describe a true 
dynamic rational equilibrium model. 
Such a structure, called multi-agent predictive control, 
has a common framework in control engineering. 
Other parts of 
Economic system
Memory
Predictive controller of 
the first agent
Predictive controller 
of the second agent
Memory
Memory
Estimator of the 
first agent 
Estimator of the 
second agent U2(t)
U1(t)
X(t+1)
Desire value of the first agent
Desire value of the second agent
First Agent
Second Agent
Other Agents
 
 
A structure for economic systems with rational 
expectation dynamic 
Stability, learnability, performance analysis, and 
robustness analysis of such systems are widely analyzed 
in engineering, and they can also be used in economic 
systems. 
We note that in the economic literature, RE models are 
touted as being endowed with model-based 
expectations[14]. This description of RE models is 
consistent with the structure proposed here.  
 
3.2 A simple model 
Suppose that the system is described by the following 
difference equations, 
 1 1X AX BU CDt t t t= + ++ +
 (6) 
 
with the following matrices: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 1 11 11 12 11 12 11 12
, , , , ,
1
2 1 2 2 21 22 21 22 21 22
11 12 13
21 22 23
X UD a a c c b bt t
X D U A C B or B
t tX D U a
b b b
b ba c c b b
t t
b
+
= = = = = = =
+
+
            
            
                       
 
where, 
Xt: State variables  
Ut: Exogenous variable  
Dt: An iid noise 
A, B, C: Constant matrices of appropriate size. 
Note that U1(t) is a exogenous variable from the view 
point of the second agent and vice versa. 
The best estimation of this system based on current 
information is, 
 1X AX BUt t t t= ++
 (7) 
Finding the expectation for q steps ahead results in 
 
( ) ( ) 11
qq q iX A X A BU
t t q t t ii
−
= + ∑+ + −
=
 (8) 
Since the estimators of prediction terms are minimum 
state variables, their result will be unique. Each agent 
tries to minimize its loss function which has the 
following form, 
( ) ( )
1
1
1( ) , ,
n
w
T
wL X X X X
t t t w d t w t t w d t wβ
=
−
= − −
+ + + +∑
(9) 
where, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 is the discount factor, Xd, t+w is the 
desired value of the states for this agent and n is the 
optimization horizon. This agent uses the following form 
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of decision making (controller) to minimize its own Loss 
function, 
 
, ( ),1( ) 2 ( )U f X U t k Xt t d t k
 
= + + 
 (10) 
where f (.) is a function which is found by the 
minimization procedure. Knowing this structure the 
system equation is rewritten as, 
, ( ),1 1 2 ( ) 2 2( ) 1X AX b f X U t k X b U CDt t t d t k t t
 
= + + + + + + + 
(11) 
where b1 is the part of B which is related to the first agent 
and b2 is the part of B which is related to the second 
agent.  
The above equation can be used to describe the system 
equation from the second agent’s point of view. This 
equation is in the form of a solutions to the RE system.  
The main difference between the solution of this model 
and the traditional solution of RE models is in the 
modeling of the expectation terms in the loss function of 
each agent instead of in their dynamic recursions. This 
means essentially that we have retained the same 
structure as the typical RE model.  
In a special case, if the optimization horizon in the loss 
function for the first agent is set to be n = 3, the function 
f (.) can be found by a routine procedure.  
Since estimates of states at time t + d depend on the 
choice of future input signals, it is necessary to make 
some assumptions about them. One possibility is to 
assume that the first agent has some information about 
input signals which are determined by the second agent, 
while its own input signal remains constant for the 
optimization horizon. In other words we assume that 
1( ) 1( 2) 1( 3)U U Ut t t= =+ +
 and U 1,2,...2(t+k) kt =
 are known. 
 With the above assumptions, the optimal controller for 
this agent can be obtained as: 
 
1
1( )U F Gt
−
= −
 (12) 
where F and G are given in the next page. 
In this simple structure we assume that the second agent 
is not using a feedback rule. Although in a real world, 
most or all agents use feedback rules, we use this 
simplifying assumption to illustrate the main concept.  
Replacing the optimal solution for the first agent, the 
stability of the system can be analysed by the eigenvalues 
of the following closed-loop transition matrix. 
4 A simple example 
4.1 Functional controllable system 
Suppose that the system structure is in the same form of 
(6), and that the system matrixes are given by (13) and 
(14), where N is the simulation horizon. Assume that N = 
100. The discount factor is set to be 0.8β = . In the 
simulation we assumed that the behaviour of the second 
agent is estimated by the first agent with noise, 
tU2(t+1)=U2(t+1) + nd(t), where nd(t) ~ iid(0,0.01). 
To analyse the stability of the system, it is only required 
that the absolute value of all the eigenvalues of the closed 
loop state transition matrix be smaller than one. The 
eigenvalues of open-loop system are [ ]1.4071    -0.0071 . 
Since the absolute value of one of them is greater than 
one, the open-loop system is unstable. But since the 
eigenvalues of the closed-loop system are
 [ ]0.8671    -0.2667 , the closed loop system is stable. 
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Figure 1.  The exogenous variables which are implied by  the first 
agent when the system is functional controllable 
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Figure 2.  Tracking of the states in a system which is functional 
controllable in the view point of the first agent 
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     
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− 
−
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−+
=
 

∼
∼
 (14) 
 
4.2 Nonfunctional controllable system 
In the previous section, we assumed that the first agent is 
able to implement two different exogenous variables, and 
so the system was functionally controllable for it. Since 
the system was functionally controllable, the state 
trajectories were similar to the desired trajectory of the 
first agent. In the following simulation it is assumed that 
the first agent is able to implement one exogenous 
variable only, rendering the system functionally 
uncontrollable. 
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Figure 3.  The exogenous variable which is implied by  the first agent 
when the system is not functional controllable 
From the figures it is clear that the trajectory of the 
second state is remarkably different from the desired 
trajectory of the first agent. It should be noted that this 
response is the optimal solution from the view point of 
the first agent as it minimizes its loss function. 
To be able to compare the functionally controllable 
system with the second functionally uncontrollable 
system, the simulations are repeated for N = 1000. The 
implied loss functions attained the following values:  
For the functionally controllable system, loss = 118.4436  
For the functionally uncontrollable system, loss = 1085.5. 
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Figure 4.  Tracking of the states in a system which is not functional 
controllable in the view point of the first agent 
5 Conclusion 
The insufficiency of BK’s determinacy condition in some 
instances of dynamic rational expectations models 
impelled us to seek alternative criteria to ensure stability 
and uniqueness. To accomplish this goal, we propose a 
new model structure for RE systems based on 
heterogeneous agents. 
We proposed a multi-agent predictive control approach to 
modelling RE systems, one that is apparently new to 
economics, even though it is based on generally accepted 
intuitive notions of natural economic behaviour. We 
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demonstrate that our approach is both analytically 
tractable and sufficient for analyzing the stability and 
performance of dynamic RE models, suggesting a 
potential of this methodology as a strong tool in the 
literature. 
In this brief report, we use a simple example to show the 
consistency of this structure with classical RE models. In 
the real world, most agents can reasonably be assumed to 
employ some version of predictive control, even though 
details will likely differ from the examples offered here. 
Whatever the case is, identification procedures should be 
added to any proposed system. Furthermore, given the 
competitive nature of markets in economies, inherent 
game-theoretic elements need to be addressed regarding 
decision rules and expectations formation. 
Finally, this paper’s focus on stability analysis does not 
preclude future work to investigate robustly stable 
structures. 
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